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In 1855 the English Parliament passed Keating's Act,1 which pro-
vided a summary proceeding for collection of bills of exchange. 2 This
predecessor of modern federal summary judgment procedure was de-
signed primarily to identify before trial debtors who sought delay
through spurious defense.3 In contemporary American federal prac-
tice, however, summary judgment is employed more frequently to
identify claimants who lack evidence sufficient to reach the jury and
who will therefore probably suffer a directed verdict or its equivalent
at trial.4 The importance of summary judgment to the defendant has
been enhanced by a specialization of function within the pretrial sys-
tem as a consequence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
mon law and to a lesser extent code pleading standards required that
the complaint contain a factual allegation of each essential element
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67.
2. See Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure, 31 IND. L.J.
329 (1956).
3. See id.
4. The federal district court decisions listed in 28 U.S.C.A. under FED. R. Cxv. P. 56,
at 35-66 (West Supp. 1973), involved a total of 243 motions for summary judgment.
In 75 of the motions (about 31 percent of the total), plaintiffs were the moving
parties; in 168 of the motions (about 69 percent), defendants were the moving parties.
Defendants were successful in obtaining summary judgment in 75 of 168 instances
(about 45 percent). Plaintiffs obtained summary judgment in 32 of 75 instances (about
43 percent).
In 52 instances defendants sought summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative
defense. This represents approximately 31 percent of the total number of motions by
defendants. When asserting affirmative defenses, defendants prevailed in 22 of 52
instances, a success rate of about 42 percent.
In 116 defense motions (about 69 percent of the total), defendants sought to establish
the nonexistence of an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. They succeeded in 53
instances, a success rate of about 46 percent. See statistical research on file with
the Yale Law Journal.
It should be noted that many summary judgment decisions are not reported and
thus are not reflected in the above statistics.
The current practice undoubtedly reflects the fact that claimants must prove all
essential unadmitted elements of a claim to succeed whereas the defendant need only
disprove one essential element of the claim in order to prevail. Persons asserting af-
firmative defenses also confront the burden of proving all essential elements and con-
sequently fall into the same analytical category as claimants when such defenses are
challenged on motion for summary judgment. The more inclusive phrase, the party
with the burden of proof, is thus more precise than "claimant." Since persons as-
serting affirmative defenses ordinarily also deny one or more of the claimant's material
allegations and will not suffer adverse judgments as a consequence of a plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment which is successful only with respect to affirmative defenses,
they face such motions much less frequently.
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of the cause of action. 5 Complaints which did not meet these stand-
ards were often defeated by demurrer, the implicit assumption for
the court's action being that the claimant could not prove what he did
not allege and would not allege, ordinarily under oath, what he could
not prove. This dubious assumption is not made under the Federal
Rules and complaints omitting essential allegations of fact will often
survive motions to dismiss. 6 Thus the motion for summary judgment
has become the first real opportunity for identifying factually deficient
claims or defenses.
Not surprisingly, most contemporary summary judgment decisions
involve challenges to the claimant, who is normally the party with the
burden of proof. Few, however, set forth a useful rationale for decid-
ing whether to grant the motion. Most simply draw from the available
cliches, which are selected in classic cut-and-paste style to support what-
ever result the court feels is proper. In reality most judges are simply
muddling through and denying the motion whenever they are in
doubt. This timorous approach obviously reduces the danger of un-
just dismissals, but it does so at the cost of permitting at least some
useless trials to be conducted."
This article will attempt to isolate the factors which account for the
inadequacy of present federal summary judgment procedure, illustrate
its incongruous features, and advocate a modest reform.
I. Federal Rule 56
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
summary judgment shall be rendered when the papers offered in sup-
port of and in opposition to the motion "show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."8 A "material fact" must be a part of a
5. See F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.5-.9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMIES].
6. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951); 5 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 120-21 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
7. See, e.g., Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
("On these facts we would be inclined to grant summary judgment. But, in this Cir-
cuit at least, District Courts may not rely to any substantial extent on summary judg-
ment predicated upon testimonial proof to avoid a full trial even though a recovery
seems hopeless . . . . Since courts are composed of mere mortals, they can decide
matters only on the basis of probability, never on certainty. The 'slightest doubt' test,
if it is taken seriously, means that summary judgment is almost never to be used-
a pity in this critical time of overstrained legal resources") (Weinstein, 1.); United
Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (denying
motion despite "the apparent flimsiness of plaintiff's claim" and with the assertion
that the claim would be dismissed at trial on the same record).
8. Fa. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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claim or defense in issue, the establishment of which requires proof
of each unadmitted essential element, as defined by the substantive law.
A "material fact" is thus an essential element of a claim or affirma-
tive defense for purposes of Rule 56(c).
The principal function of the motion for summary judgment is to
show that one or more of the essential elements of a claim or defense
before the court is not in doubt and that, as a result, judgment can be
rendered as a matter of law. With minor exceptions, Rule 56 con-
templates the granting of a final judgment.10 When the movant seeks
a final judgment, he must seek to establish the existence or nonexist-
ence of enough essential elements of a claim and its related defenses
and avoidances to permit full disposition of the claim as a matter of
law, as the Rule provides. If the movant bears the burden of proof-
either because he is the plaintiff or because he is asserting an affirma-
tive defense-then he must establish all essential elements of the claim
or defense." If the movant does not bear the burden of proof, then
he can obtain summary judgment simply by showing the nonexistence
of any essential element of the opposing party's claim or affirmative
defense. Of course when the movant is a plaintiff he must ordinarily
do more than defeat the opposing party's affirmative defenses in order
9. See Andersen v. Schulman, 337 F. Supp. 177, 182 (N.D. Ill. 1971). A motion for
summary judgment may raise only a question of law. This use parallels the function
of other motions designed to challenge the validity of a legal theory, such as the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), the
motion to strike (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f)), and the motion for judgment on the plead-
ings (Fan. R. Civ. P. 12(c)). These other motions may sometimes be used to challenge the
omission of an essential element from the opposing party's pleading or establish one ad-
mitted therein. None of them, however, can be used to show that the existence of an
essential element, though properly placed in issue by the pleadings, is in fact not in doubt.
10. The term "judgment" is defined by the Rules as follows: "'Judgment' as used
in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." Fan. R. Civ.
P. 54(a). For a discussion of the conflict between the terminology of Rule 56 and the
explicit allowance in Rule 56(a) of partial summary adjudication, from which there
is no appeal, see 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE i 56.20[3.-0] (2d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as MooRaE]. Where multiple claims or parties are involved, summary judg-
ment may be granted for or against less than all the parties and on less than all
the claims. The judgment granted is not final, however, unless the requirements of
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) are also satisfied. Rule 54(b) allows final judgment as to fewer
than all the claims only when the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay.
11. If the movant is seeking to establish an affirmative defense, then it is arguable
that he must go on to establish the nonexistence of at least one essential element of
every avoidance of the affirmative defense which the claimant has asserted. This ap-
proach seems to put an undue burden on the movant. Although an affirmative de-
fense is deemed avoided automatically by FED. R. Cmv. P. 8(d), the establishment of
such a defense should entitle the moving party to summary judgment if the claimant
fails to respond with affidavits or other acceptable supporting materials establishing
the prima facie existence of an avoidance. See FEm. R. Cmv. P. 56(e). If the claimant
had no obligation to support his avoidance in such circumstances and could simply
rely on FED. R. Cmv. P. 8(d), the moving party would have to offer evidence negating
every possible avoidance. See Bonlware v. Parker, 457 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1972);
Burke v. Gateway Clipper, Inc., 441 F.2d 946, 948-49 (3d Cir. 1971).
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to obtain a final judgment. Since the opposing party will probably
have denied the allegations in the claim in addition to advancing an
affirmative defense, the movant-plaintiff must go on to establish the
existence of all unadmitted elements of his claim. 12
If a motion for summary judgment is otherwise in order, the court
must then decide the critical, final question of whether there is a
"genuine issue" of fact with respect to the existence of the essential
elements the motion has questioned or sought to establish. Commenta-
tors generally agree that under existing law the movant has the burden
of clearly establishing the absence of any issue of material fact, even
if his opponent would bear the burden of proof on that issue at trial.13
It is the contention of this article that a better approach would be
to coordinate summary judgment proof requirements with the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof at trial. The way in which the question
regarding any "genuine issue [of] ... fact"' 4 is resolved should depend
primarily upon the nature of the moving party's trial proof burden:
Courts should grant such motions less readily when the moving party
is seeking to establish the existence of an essential element of a claim
or defense that he has asserted and with respect to which he bears the
burden of proof at trial than when he is seeking to establish the non-
existence of an essential element of a claim or defense asserted against
him and with respect to which the opposing party bears the burden
of proof at trial (or, more precisely, the burden of production or of
coming forward).
The present summary judgment evidentiary standard, which re-
quires the movant to "establish clearly" the absence of issues of ma-
terial fact,15 seems appropriate when applied in the context of a mo-
tion by the party with the trial proof burden. Such a motion is closely
analogous to the party's motion at trial for a directed verdict on the
same issue.' 6 In both situations the moving party must present such
proof of the existence of the element that no fact-finder could reason-
ably find against him.1' As in the directed verdict context, the motion
for summary judgment will ordinarily be denied whenever the oppos-
ing party responds with affidavits or other supporting materials'8
12. See note 4 supra.
13. See, e.g. 6 MooRE 56.15[3], at 238643; 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6,
§ 2727, at 524-25.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
15. See p. 752 infra.
16. See 6 MooRE 56.1513], at 2341.
17. See Mihalchak v. American Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875, 877 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959); 9 WRIGHT &- MILLER § 2535, at 591.
18. The response may include or rely upon helpful parts of the moving party's
own supporting materials. See 6 MooRE 56.15[3], at 2,40.
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which contradict the moving party's proof or otherwise create a rea-
sonable doubt as to the existence of an essential element or which
substantially impeach the credibility of a material witness when the
moving party's proof is testimonial. 19
The close correspondence between trial proof burden and the sum-
mary judgment evidentiary standard is limited to situations in which
the movant is the party with the trial burden of proof. When he would
not have that burden, it is the contention of this article that the sum-
mary judgment evidentiary standard should be relaxed.
20
II. Establishing the Nonexistence of an Essential Element
of a Claim or Defense Asserted by the Opposing Party
A. The Moving Party's Initial Burden
A movant who would not have the trial proof burden clearly must
support his motion with some affidavits or other materials showing or
at least suggesting the nonexistence of an essential element of the op-
19. See 10 WRIGHT 9- MILLER § 2726, at 521. The directed verdict analogy remains
applicable even if the opposing party fails to submit counteraffidavits or other sup-
porting materials or those he proffers are rejected as clearly inadequate. In such cir-
cumstances the movant can obtain a "default" summary judgment under Rule 56(e)
only "if [it would be] appropriate." For the party with the burden of proof this
means in effect that he must still succeed on the strength of his own evidence. Just
as in the directed verdict context, the motion should ordinarily be denied, notwith-
standing the inadequacy of the opposing party's response, in certain circumstances.
First, it should be denied if the moving party's supporting evidence is self-contradictory
or circumstantially suspicious. See, e.g., Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482,
499, 126 A.2d 323, 333 (1956) (claim under an insurance policy for property stolen
under suspicious circumstances; directed verdict denied); Bobbe, The Uncontradicted
Testimony of an Interested Witness, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 33, 35 (1934); Cooper, Directions
for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903, 946 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Cooper].
Second, the motion should be denied if the credibility of a witness is inherently sus-
pect because he is interested in the outcome of the case, his motives or state of mind
are material, or he has exclusive access to the facts in question. A typical "exclusive
access" case involves testimony by taxpayers seeking refunds. See Wood v. Commis-
sioner, 338 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964). But cf. Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 571
(5th Cir. 1970) (successfully establishing the defense of "good faith meeting of com-
petition" in a Robinson-Patman Act private action).
Third, denial is appropriate if there are significant gaps in the movant's evidence
or if it is circumstantial and reasonably allows inferences inconsistent with the ex-
istence of an essential element. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
160 (1970) (barring summary judgment for the party without the burden of proof
because of evidentiary gaps); 5A MOORE, supra note 10, 50.02[l] (directed verdicts).
Finally, the motion should be denied if there remains, after all the evidentiary or
historical facts are established, the need to apply some legal principle, e.g., the prudent
man standard in negligence cases, generally entrusted to the jury. See, e.g., Croley v.
Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 76 (5th Cir. 1970); 6 MooRE 56.17[42], at 2583.
Even in this situation, summary judgment may be granted if a "reasonable" jury could
reach but one result. See Jones v. Borden Co., supra; American Airlines v. Ulen, 186
F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
20. See pp. 753-59 infra.
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posing party's case.21 A more lenient requirement would permit him
to harass the opposing party too easily. The degree of persuasiveness
with which he must show or suggest this nonexistence in order to com-
pel the opposing party to respond at his peril is the crucial issue. Be-
fore that question is reached, however, several important corollaries
can be derived simply from the conclusion that the moving party faces
some burden. First, if he fails to discharge the burden, his motion fails,
even though the opposing party makes no response.22 Second, if he dis-
charges this burden, he should be deemed to have established the non-
existence of the essential element in question unless the opposing party
responds adequately. 23 Ordinarily the motion must then be granted.
Third, the opposing party will be required to respond only with re-
spect to those essential elements of the claim upon which the moving
party has discharged his burden. 24 These three principles are not spe-
cifically stated in Rule 56, but they are consistent with its text if it is
assumed that summary judgment is "appropriate" under Rule 56(e)26
whenever the moving party discharges his burden and the opposing
party responds inadequately.
2 6
There are essentially two methods by which the moving party can
discharge his burden. First, through discovery he can obtain a preview
of his opponent's evidence on an essential element and contend, in sup-
port of his motion, that the evidence is insufficient to discharge the
opponent's production burden. If his contention is correct he dis-
charges his own burden and shifts to the opposing party the onus of
producing additional evidence or excusing his failure to do so under
Rule 56(f).27 Second, by previewing his own proof he can attempt to
show the nonexistence of an essential element asserted by the opposing
party. He can, of course, combine these two approaches. 28
21. The accepted rule is that the moving party bears the burden of showing
there is no genuine issue of fact. See, e.g., Franklin National Bank v. L. B. Meadows
& Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 6 MooRE 56.15[3], at 2335.
22. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Bouivare v. Parker, 457 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1972); Andersen v.
Schulman, 337 F. Supp. 177, 181-82 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Scott v. Dollahite, 54 F.R.D. 430,
433 (N.D. Miss. 1972); 6 MoORE 56.15[3].
24. See 6 MOORE j 56.15[3].
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides, inter alia, "When a motion for summary judg-
ment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him."
26. See Scott v. Dollahite, 54 F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
27. See, e.g., Burke v. Gateway Clipper, Inc., 441 F.2d 946, 948 (3d Cir. 1971); Avery
v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 52 F.R.D. 356, 359 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
28. In Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952), plaintiff admitted in
discovery his exclusive reliance upon several eyewitnesses. Defendant obtained from
each an affidavit or deposition denying the plaintiff's allegation and successfully moved
for summary judgment.
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The first approach is necessary when direct proof is generally lack-
ing2 and commends itself whenever the opposing party's witnesses are
few and can be deposed without undue effort or expense. On the other
hand, this approach is burdensome and costly when the opposing party
will rely upon a large number of witnesses or documents. In such a
situation the second approach may be more attractive. Furthermore,
under the first approach a defendant-movant would assume the onus
of showing that the plaintiff lacks a prima facie case in order to compel
him to respond at his peril, even though at trial the plaintiff must pre-
sent a prima facie case before the defendant must decide whether and
how to respond.
1. Present Standard for Movant's Evidence
For the reasons mentioned above, the moving party will often at-
tempt to discharge his burden primarily through a preview of his own
proof. It is in this context that the question of sufficiency of the mov-
ant's evidence arises. If his proof will not even support a jury finding
that the essential element does not exist (that is, it would not establish
prima facie the nonexistence of the element), the moving party has
obviously failed to discharge his burden.30 On the other hand, if the
moving party's proof is so strong that reasonable minds cannot reject
it (that is, it would meet even the standard imposed upon the party
with the burden of proof when he moves for summary judgment), the
moving party has obviously discharged his burden. But will something
29. For instance, in a case arising out of a fatal auto collision with no survivors or
other eyewitnesses, plaintiff must rely upon such circumstantial evidence as skid marks.
Here defendant may discover plaintiff's evidence and move for summary judgment
if it is insufficient.
30. See Bridges v. Internal Revenue Service, 433 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 1970).
(Though the affidavits of defendant-movants here "tended to show" the existence of ex-
ecutive immunity and summary judgment was therefore proper since plaintiff filed
no counter-affidavit, the defendant officers could not have obtained summary judgment
in this situation by merely relying on "bare conclusory allegations.") The Bridges
court may have applied an inappropriately loose standard in evaluating the initial ade-
quacy of the movant's evidence. While the court applied a "tended to show" test,
the traditional "clearly establish" test would have been proper, particularly since
executive immunity is an affirmative defense, see Green v. James, 473 F.2d 660, 661
(9th Cir. 1973), on which the movant would have borne the proof burden at trial.
Nonetheless the validity of the dicta-which suggest that a bare allegation will not
discharge the burden of a movant without the trial burden-remains unimpaired.
A similar principle governs in the summary judgment procedures of many state
court systems. In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
282 N.C. 44, 57, 191 S.E.2d 683, 692 (1972), plaintiff alleged that defendant had un-
reasonably delayed charging back a draft after learning of a forged endorsement
thereon. Defendant moved for summary judgment supported by an affidavit stating
that it had, upon receiving notice of the forgery, charged back the draft pursuant
to normal banking procedures. But this conclusory statement was not supported by
specific facts, such as the date the payee learned of the forgery, and was, therefore,
arguably insufficient to support a finding on the nonexistence of the unreasonable
delay plaintiff alleged. The court held summary judgment should be denied.
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less than the overwhelming proof required of the party with the bur-
den of proof suffice? Some opinions3' and treatise writers suggest it
will not.
Professor Moore, for instance, implies that the movant must satisfy
a uniform proof burden, regardless of whether he would have the bur-
den of proof at trial.32 Imposing such a requirement on the movant
makes it extremely difficult for him to compel the opposing party to
preview his proof, even though the latter will bear the production bur-
den at trial and even though it appears doubtful that he could dis-
charge it. Thus the opposing party could sometimes defeat a motion
for summary judgment simply by withholding proof, the inadequacy
of 'which, if disclosed, would probably lead to his defeat.
Such a requirement also conflicts with the assigned function of sum-
mary judgment within the pretrial system of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The task of intercepting factually insufficient claims or
defenses has been taken from the motion to dismiss-the successor to
the demurrer-and given to the motion for summary judgment.3 3 A
conclusory, factually deficient pleading will usually survive a motion to
dismiss. If the party moving for summary judgment must discharge a
rigorous proof burden regardless of whether h would bear the burden
of proof at trial, he could almost never compel the pleader to demon-
strate that he can prove the essential elements which he was in the past
required to allege in detail. As a result the movant could rarely inter-
cept a factually deficient claim or defense. Given the severe congestion
of most court dockets, 34 such an interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is most unfortunate.
Admittedly a moving party who could not satisfy so stringent a proof
requirement could still resort to the first approach of discovering the
opposing party's evidence. That alternative would not be very helpful,
however, if the prohibitive cost of the first had already driven him to
the second. Furthermore, this interpretation does not explain away the
incongruity of a rule that virtually shifts the burden of proof away
from the party who will bear it at trial.
31. See James v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 464 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1972) (moving
party must demonstrate entitlement beyond a reasonable doubt); Chubbs v. City of
New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no summary judgment on testi-
monial proof, even though recovery seems hopeless, if there is the slightest doubt);
Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(interested eyewitness affidavits may fail to discharge moving party's burden where
credibility is important); Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D.
468. 470 (S D.N.Y. 1961) (where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts the motion
for summary judgment should be denied.
32. See 6 MOO3E, supra note 10, 56.15131, at 2342.
33. See C. WsGaT, F-EAL COuaTs § 68 (2d ed. 1970).
34. See note 7 supra.
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For these reasons some courts might concede that the moving party
should be able to discharge his burden if he makes a strong showing
on both approaches, though he fails to perfect either. In other words,
he should be able to discharge his burden if he demonstrates merely
the probability, rather than the near certainty, that the opposing party
could not or would not get to the jury at trial.35
Unfortunately a probability test is imprecise and finds n6 analogue
in directed verdict practice to assist in its application. Consequently it
would resist uniform application and virtually invite ad hoc responses.
Such an infirmity would seem to inhere in any "middle ground" ap-
proach, regardless of how articulated.
2. A Proposed Evidentiary Standard
One solution to this problem would be to put only a minimal initial
burden on the movant who would not have the trial proof burden. A
possible "minimal burden" formulation is as follows: The moving
party discharges his initial burden whenever he presents enough evi-
dence to support a jury finding that the essential element does not
exist. This test understandably raises the fear that the moving party
will be able to harass the opposing party too easily or succeed unfairly
too frequently. It also raises the fundamental question of whether a
few wrongful dismissals constitute a greater evil than many unnecessary
trials.
a. Derivation of Standard
To evaluate these issues a simple hypothetical will be considered. A
complaint alleges on information and belief that defendant slandered
plaintiff in the presence of four persons. If defendant moves for sum-
mary judgment, supporting his motion with the affidavits of the four
witnesses and himself denying the slander, he can clearly discharge his
burden.3" If he produces the affidavits of only two of the four and
those two are interested witnesses, the issue requires closer examina-
tion. Does his failure to obtain affidavits from the other two suggest
35. No discovered opinion articulates the test in these terms. Opinions holding
that a moving party has discharged his burden with the affidavits of interested wit-
nesses, when the opposing party lacks equal access to the facts, arguably embrace this
test, since such evidence will not discharge the summary judgment evidentiary burden
of a party with the trial proof burden. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress 9- Co., 398 U.S.
144, 158 (1970) (apparent finding that defendant might have discharged its burden as
to a preexisting conspiracy' through interested affidavits denying the same) (dictum).
36. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1952). Since defendant showed
that plaintiff could find no witness to support him, defendant perfected the first ap-
proach. Whether he also perfected the second would probably depend upon whether any
of the witnesses was disinterested, since plaintiff personally lacked access to the facts.
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that their testimony would be unfavorable to him? A court might so
conclude if those two had refused to give affidavits to the plaintiff. The
court's reluctance to grant the movant's motion in this circumstance
might be based as well on economic considerations. It would be waste-
ful to compel the opposing party to depose the two witnesses when he
can subpoena them for trial at virtually no cost. Thus, even though
the opposing party needs their testimony to succeed at trial, and even
though the movant has already produced enough evidence to support
a jury finding that no slander occurred, a court might hold here that
the movant had failed to discharge his burden.3
7
Such a result should not necessarily obtain when the movant's po-
tential witnesses are more numerous. The inference that missing affi-
davits would be unfavorable to him obviously diminishes as the cost
and bother of collecting them increases and as more and more favor-
able affidavits are submitted. Thus a reasonable sampling of many
witnesses should suffice to discharge the movant's burden.38 In addi-
tion, the inference is not compelling if the movant fails to go to the
expense of deposing unfriendly witnesses who refused to give him affi-
davits. In fact, the opposite conclusion might follow if they were
friends of the opposing party, who had failed to obtain counter-affi-
davits from them.
But where neither party can obtain affidavits from important wit-
nesses, the question of who should bear the burden of deposing them
is somewhat difficult to answer. The movant is the party seeking to
disturb the status quo. However, he has already previewed in his affi-
davits testimony that would support a jury finding in his favor. This
would seem to be a sufficient showing to compel the opposing party to
break his silence. The opposing party's principal excuse is economic.
The cost of depositions may be so great in some cases that he could be
forced into an unfair settlement,3 9 whereas, without this obligation,
he could merely interview witnesses now and subpoena them later for
trial.40
37. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress 9- Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970) (noting moving party's
failure to submit affidavit of a key eyewitness).
38. See Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (acceptable sampling of persons who manage defendant department store's ad-
vertising and have denied its participation in an alleged advertising boycott of plaintiff).
39. The seriousness of the problem would mount as the ratio of the deposition
costs to the amount in controversy increased. The plaintiff's plight seems most serious
when the affidavit of one disinterested witness can bring him to this point. See, e.g.,
Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966) (granting motion for summary
judgment for party with the burden of proof when the motion is supported by one
disinterested affiant).
40. Such a contention by plaintiff was seemingly rejected in Dale Hilton, Inc. v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), but there plaintiff failed
to make a clear showing under Rule 56(f) that affidavits were unavailable from the
numerous witnesses it was reluctant to depose.
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Although the opposing party's fears have some validity, they can be
accommodated in other ways. 41 Given such accommodation, it seems
persuasive that if the movant establishes the prima facie nonexistence
of an essential element of the opposing party's claim through the affi-
davits of all witnesses from whom he can get them-or a fair sample if
the number is large-he should succeed in discharging his burden even
though all the affiants are interested. 42
Such a result seems irresistible when the opposing party has other
access to the facts in question.43 But even if the movant alone has first-
hand access, some showing by the opposing party before trial of evi-
dence or prospects for obtaining it should be required once the movant
has previewed interested testimony that would support a jury finding
in his favor. If so, it follows that the sole eyewitness testimony of a
party adverse to the opposing party44 or some other equally unreliable
witness can discharge the movant's burden. For example, in a con-
spiracy case the affidavits of the defendants denying the conspiracy
would be sufficient to put plaintiff to his proof, even though he has
no eyewitnesses and may have to build an elaborate case based on docu-
mentary and circumstantial evidence. 45 Confronted with such an argu-
41. See pp. 768-69 infra.
42. See p. 764 infra. Lower courts have indicated an unwillingness to allow
the movant to discharge his evidentiary burden with interested testimonial evidence,
at least when he would bear the trial proof burden. See, e.g., Block v. Biddle, 36
F.R.D. 426, 429 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (summary judgment should be denied even where
testimonial evidence is uncontradicted if (a) credibility is an issue, (b) movant has
the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of credible evidence, and (c) the
uncontradicted witness has an interest in the case which requires the jury to weigh
his credibility) (dictum). See generally 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2726, at
521. ("A problem arises . . . when there only are latent doubts as to credibility, as
when some of the evidence necessary to establish that no genuine issue exists is pre-
sented by an 'interested' person .... .)
43. See Continental Casualty Co. v. American Security Corp., 443 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971) (summary judgment for party with burden
of proof where opposing party with access to the facts failed to contradict the testi-
mony of an interested affiant); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 319 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.
Mich. 1970).
44. See Weymann v. Wilson, 320 F. Supp. 980, 988 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (defendant's
own uncontradicted affidavit denying conspiracy accepted as true for purposes of her
successful motion for summary judgment even though she was the only surviving
witness). But ef. Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(suggesting that summary judgment is unavailable in the Second Circuit when moving
party relies on testimonial evidence).
45. The Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that summary judgment
should be used sparingly for defendants in antitrust conspiracy cases. Norfolk Monu-
ment Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 704 (1969); First Nat'l
Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 303 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). Lower courts, however,
continue to grant summary judgment for defendants in conspiracy cases on the basis
of their affidavits denying the conspiracy. See, e.g., Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co.,
316 F. Stipp. 1321 (E.D N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972) (noting plaintiff's failure to use discovery to obtain evidence).
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Court seemed to find that
defendants had discharged their burden through their own affidavits denying the
alleged conspiracy, but reversed the grant of summary judgment because defendants had
not denied the existence of a subsequent conspiracy.
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ment, plaintiff might contend that minimal effort on the part of de-
fendant would compel him to develop a prima facie case before trial,
reduce it to affidavits or other supporting materials satisfying the
requirements of Rule 5 6(e), arfd disclose it all to defendant.46
Of course the opposing party is not necessarily compelled to disclose
his entire case. His response would be adequate if it contained enough
evidence to reach the jury on each of the essential elements upon which
the movant has discharged his burden. With respect to his fear of pre-
mature disclosure of his case, the opposing party can in any event be
compelled to disclose his evidence on discovery. Is partial disclosure
through a motion for summary judgment analytically different simply
because it provides a simpler mechanism for discovery?
Requiring the opposing party to respond in this situation does not
place a special or unusual onus upon him. In the absence of the re-
quirement, the movant can still discover the opposing party's evidence
and discharge his burden by showing its insufficiency.47 The opposing
party must then invoke Rule 56(f) and petition the court for a delay
while he gathers additional evidence or for a dispensation allowing him
to go to trial without it. Why shouldn't the movant be able to obtain
the same functional result by previewing evidence that establishes
the prima facie nonexistence of an essential element of the opposing
party's case?
The tentative answer is that the two alternatives differ significantly.
With one, the movant bears the onus and the cost of discovery. With
the other, the opposing party bears those burdens unless he is able to
use the prohibitive cost of discovery as the basis for a Rule 56(f)
excuse.
48
At first glance, it might seem that by accepting such an excuse the
court has returned the movant to square one. But some progress has
been made. The court will at least have examined the opposing party's
excuse and evaluated his prospects for obtaining sufficient evidence
for trial. Admittedly this approach can raise the cost of litigation to a
level that would sometimes force the opposing party into an unfair
46. See, e.g., Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 475-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (the court rejected the excuse because, inter alia, defendant had al-
ready taken discovery).
47. See p. 750 supra. For a discussion approving the use of summary judgment
as a discovery device, see C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 88, at 566 (2d ed. 1947).
48. See Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 476 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (rejecting such an excuse because, inter alia, plaintiff was seeking $18 million
in damages).
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settlement. 40 On the other hand, if the movant can prevent a lengthy
trial only by exposing the insufficiency of the opposing party's case,
he can sometimes be forced into an unfair settlement by an opposing
party who lacks a real case. It thus appears inevitable that in many
circumstances one of the parties will face an economic burden which
will induce settlement. If so, the movant who seeks summary judgment
arguably should have to shoulder the initial expense burden. Still the
opposing party, assuming he is the plaintiff, has merely filed a com-
plaint, while the movant has at least presented evidence that would
justify a jury finding in his favor. If this prima facie evidence is not
sufficient to compel the opposing party to offer some evidence in re-
sponse, the movant must then bear the further financial burden of
discovering the insufficiency of the opposing party's evidence.
Factors other than economic cost bear on the issue of whether the
opposing party should be required to assemble and proffer, in effect,
a prima facie case in response to a motion for summary judgment.
The opposing party may doubt that he will be able to satisfy this re-
quirement at any cost. For example, in conspiracy cases and others
where access to the evidence is unequal, depositions will often be an
inadequate substitute for the examination as on cross-examination of
hostile witnesses at trial. But in this situation the very inadequacy of
pretrial depositions may excuse the opposing party, who in this case
would be the plaintiff, from compliance with the requirement since
such a peculiar need for cross-examination at trial would seem-to fall
squarely within the ambit of a Rule 56(f) excuse. 51
The possibility exists, of course, that trial judges may not give fair
consideration to the opposing party's excuses. But that is a risk inherent
in any motion directed to the merits and unfair determinations may
be cured by appellate courts. Surely the efficacy of the summary judg-
49. It does not follow that the proposal offered in text will automatically expose
plaintiff to the harassment of frivolous motions. If the court believes that defendant's
intent is to harass, it can always accept as sufficient a response by plaintiff containing
some evidence and a demonstration of prospects for obtaining more. In an extreme
case it could deny the motion as frivolous. Conceivably it could also impose upon
defendant the cost of transforming more of plaintiff's potential evidence to deposi-
tions or other acceptable supporting materials. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) permits the court
to "make such other order as is just" when the opposing party cannot "for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition." See Mackay v.
American Potash & Chem. Co., 268 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1959) (court notes trial
judge's willingness to have plaintiff reimburse one of defendants for services of attorney
and cost of attorney's travel to appear at hearing).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, which provides that an attorney's signature on a pleading con-
stitutes his certification that it is not frivolous, may offer some additional protection.
50. For a discussion of the prima facie response requirement see p. 759 infra.
51. See p. 766 infra.
The Yale Law Journal
ment piocedure should not be emasculated because trial courts some-
times err.
b. Formulation of Standard
The conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that a moving
party who seeks to show the nonexistence of an essential element of a
claim or defense asserted against him discharges his burden whenever
his supporting materials, from which there are no glaring omissions
of evidence to which he has apparent access, (1) show that the opposing
party lacks or cannot obtain evidence sufficient to discharge his pro-
duction burden, or (2) contain a preview of evidence that would sup-
port a finding that the essential element does not exist.
The second half of the test represents something of an innovation.
If courts allowed the movant who would not have the burden of proof
at trial to sustain his summary judgment burden by making a mere
prima facie showing with respect to the nonexistence of an essential
element of the opposing party's case, then surely the movant's chances
for success would be enhanced. Thus, while few courts would quarrel
with the first part of the test5 2 many would probably question the
second. In truth it is hard to know where many courts stand because
they often confuse the present question of what is sufficient to compel
the opposing party to respond with the separate questions of what is
a sufficient response and what is an adequate excuse for an insufficient
response. 53
The functional implications of the second portion of the proposed
test are admittedly significant. If the movant makes the requisite prima
facie showing, the opposing party has, in effect, the burden of going
forward. After such a showing by the movant, the opposing party
would not ordinarily be permitted to go to trial without a prima facie
case in hand or an excuse acceptable to the court.54 This is clearly a
radical change from pre-Federal Rules practice. Furthermore, it is not
specifically required by the text of Rule 56.
Yet the second element of the proposed test has a significant advan-
tage over present doctrine: It eliminates the incongruous shift of the
evidentiary burden in a summary judgment proceeding away from the
party who will bear it at trial. And it permits the court to reach the
real question of whether the opposing party has a prima facie case or
reasonable prospects for obtaining one by or at trial.
52. See 10 WRGmHr & MxmuR, supra note 6, § 2727, at 531.
53. See note 30 supra.
54. See p. 759 infra.
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The proposed standard would require some modification of the ex-
isting credibility rule. At present the movant cannot succeed if the
opposing party challenges the credibility of the movant's witnesses and
makes a preliminary showing of the possibility of impeachment.r5
But if the movant is only required to make a prima facie showing this
rule is inappropriate. The opposing party should not be able to evade
the response requirement by attacking the credibility of the movant's
evidence except in instances where the attack is sufficiently strong to
render the prima facie evidence incredible as a matter of law.56
B. The Opposing Party's Response
When the moving party discharges his burden, he is ordinarily en-
titled to summary judgment if the opposing party fails to respond or
presents an inadequate response or excuse.57 A response is clearly in-
adequate if it contains only unsupported denials or general allega-
tions. 6 It is clearly adequate if it contains a preview of evidence suffi-
cient to support a jury finding that each successfully challenged essen-
tial element of the opposing party's case exists.59 In judging the ade-
quacy of the response, the court may not consider the credibility of the
supporting witnesses ° or the weight of the evidence6' and may not
reject any favorable inferences that might reasonably be drawn, 2 even
though jury trial has been waived.
63
55. See 10 WRIGHT & MLLER§ 2726, at 521.
56. See 6 MooR,supra note 10, 56.15[4], at 2369.
57. See, e.g., Scott v. Dollahite, 54 F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (dictum); 10
WRIGHT & IILLER § 2740, at 723-24.
58. See, e.g., Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141 (3d Cir. 1972);
Dawn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358, 361 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Franklin Nat'l
Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This result
seems to be required by FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), which provides that the response "must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
59. "All courts agree . . . that summary judgment should be denied whenever a
directed verdict would be denied if the evidence at trial stood in the same posture
as the material on file upon the motion." JAMES, supra note 5, § 6.18 at 235.
60. Neither summary judgment nor directed verdict can be granted when contra-
dictions in opposing testimony can be resolved only by evaluating the credibility of
the witnesses. See id. § 6.18, at 232. Hence the opposing party's affiants are assigned
credibility for the purposes of the motion.
61. Where the opposing party has responded with evidence sufficient to reach the
jury, he cannot suffer a directed verdict or summary judgment in the federal courts
even if the weight of the moving party's evidence is so much greater that the court
would set aside a jury verdict for the opposing party. See id. § 6.18, at 231, § 7.20,
at 314.
62. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); 10 WRIGHT - MILLER, supra note 6, § 2727.
63. In cases tried to the court without a jury, the judge as trier of fact is em-
powered to find against plaintiff at the close of his evidence even if he has presented
a prima facie case. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). If the court so finds, it must make findings
of fact and conclusions of law. It has been suggested that the trial judge might ex-
ercise the same power in nonjury cases if both parties move for summary judgment.
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The effect of not allowing the judge to weigh the evidence is that
the moving party's evidence is usually ignored in evaluating the suffi-
ciency of the opposing party's response. There are important excep-
tions to this practice, however. For example, the moving party's evi-
dence may always be used by the opposing party to bolster his case.64
Conversely it may be used sometimes to defeat the opposing party, even
though he has established a prima facie case. If, for example, the mov-
ing party's evidence establishes incontravertible physical facts that ren-
der the opposing party's testimonial evidence incredible as a matter of
law6" or if the opposing party's case relies upon a presumption or in-
ference drawn from circumstantial evidence and the moving party's
evidence contains direct proof of the nonexistence of the fact presumed
or inferred, then the movant's evidence may be taken into account.00
In order to grant the motion in the teeth of the opposing party's prima
facie case, the court must be satisfied that the movant's evidence is so
strong that no reasonable fact-finder can reject it. If the evidence is
testimonial, it should also be disinterested, uncontradicted, and unim-
peached. 67 In other words, if the opposing party presents a prima facie
response, the movant's evidence should be treated as if it were offered
in support of a motion for summary judgment by the party with the
burden of proof.
Most courts and commentators adopt this rationale in the analogous
directed verdict context in order to take into account evidence under-
cutting the opposing party's response.0 8 Dictum in a Supreme Court
opinion, rendered in this context, which would limit the trial court's
consideration to evidence favoring the opposing party, 9 has generally
been restricted by lower federal courts to F.E.L.A. cases.
70
1. The "Slightest Doubt" Test
Despite near unanimity on the issue of what evidence can be taken
into account in evaluating the opposing party's response, the standard
If he were to do so, the judge would have transformed the proceeding from a sum-
mary judgment hearing to a trial. See 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 1239, at 178 (1958). Some courts have been unwilling to countenance such
a transformation. See American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broad-
casting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
64. See 6 MooRE, supra note 10, 56.15[3], at 2340 n.17.
65. See JAMES, supra note 5, § 7.13, at 285; cf. Cooper, supra note 19, at 951 (di-
rected verdict).
66. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 277 (1968).
67. See generally 6 MOORE § 56.15[41, at 2369; cf. 5A id. 50.02[1], at 2321-22
(directed verdict); Cooper, supra note 19, at 948-50 (directed verdict).
68. See 5A MOORE 50.02[1], at 2321-22; Cooper 948-50.
69. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949).
70. See 5A MooRE 50.02[1], at 2329.
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of evaluation remains unclear. Some opinions, especially those orig-
inating from courts within the Second Circuit, seem to hold that a
response evidencing much less than a prima facie case will suffice to
defeat the motion. These opinions frequently hold that the motion
must be denied whenever there is the "slightest doubt" as to whether
the opposing party will fail to reach the jury at trial."1 The "doubt" in
this connection is apparently not with respect to whether the opposing
party's response discloses a prima facie case. To deny summary judg-
ment in light of such a doubt would be unobjectionable.7 2 The "slight-
est doubt" test employed by the Second Circuit, though, seems to ask
whether the opposing party could conceivably develop a prima facie
case at trial, notwithstanding the strength of the moving party's proof.73
Thus, the movant seemingly cannot succeed unless he shows the non-
existence of the challenged essential element with evidence so strong
no reasonable fact-finder can reject it.74 This standard thus treats the
motion by a party who would not have the trial proof burden in pre-
cisely the same manner as a motion for summary judgment by a party
with the burden of proof. As a district judge in the Second Circuit
commented, it means that summary judgment would have to be denied
on facts requiring the grant of a motion for directed verdict.7
If the Second Circuit's approach were generally adopted, Rule 56(f)
71. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1970); Chubbs v. City
of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.DN.Y. 1971); United Rubber Workers v. Lee
Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
6, § 2725, at 508 n.18.
72. It has been suggested that the "slightest doubt" test is merely a misleading
gloss on the words "genuine issue" in Rule 56(c) and expresses little more than the
notion that the opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts
in the evaluation of his response. See 10 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2727.
73. See, e.g., United Rubber Workers v. Lee Natl Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("Plaintiff's papers show that it has enough evidence to preclude our
holding that plaintiff could not possibly prove its case"). In this decision the court
denied summary judgment even though "[i]f the record before us at trial were the
same as that before us on this motion, judgment would be entered in favor of the
Company." Id.
74. See James v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 464 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1972) (moving
party must demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment beyond reasonable doubt).
The "slightest doubt" or "reasonable doubt" test has been employed when the op-
posing party had failed to respond and the apparent question was whether the moving
party had discharged his burden. But in most of these cases the doubt was created
by some of the moving party's own evidence, which the opposing party may always
appropriate. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Thus the same result should occur if the opposing party actually
responds with this evidence.
75. United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (Mansfield, J.). See note 74 supra; Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183,
1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). (In the Second Circuit, district courts may not place sub-
stantial reliance on testimonial proof in granting summary judgment even when re-
covery seems hopeless.)
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and the 1963 additions to Rule 56(e)76 would be virtual nullities. In-
deed the opposing party could even withhold his evidence whenever
the movant's supporting materials gave rise to some doubt or uncer-
tainty favoring the opposing party, even though that doubt or uncer-
tainty would not be sufficient to support a jury finding for the oppos-
ing party that the essential element existed. It would mean, in short,
the virtual emasculation of the summary judgment procedure. 77
Fortunately the "slightest doubt" test may not be intended for gen-
eral application. In most of the decisions employing it the opposing
party had obviously suffered a wrong or injury, but he could not re-
cover unless he showed it was the product of defendant's participation
in a conspiracy or his improper state of mind. In such cases the requi-
site evidence is peculiarly available to the opposing partyT8 Interest-
ingly, the Supreme Court has tended to limit its grant of certiorari to
this kind of case.79 Furthermore, its customary reversal of a lower
court's grant of the motion in these circumstances has provided the
direction, if not the doctrinal justification, for the Second Circuit's
use of the "slightest doubt" test. 0
2. Proposed Standard
A more flexible approach exists for dealing with such "peculiar ac-
cess" cases. If the opposing party cannot prove the conspiracy or im-
proper state of mind directly, he must rely upon circumstantial evi-
dence. If this evidence, or any found in the movant's supporting ma-
terials, establishes a prima facie case, the motion for summary judg-
76. The last two sentences of Rule 56(e), added by amendment of Jan. 21, 1963,
effective July 1, 1963, read as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading. but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
The Advisory Committee's Notes, reprinted in 28 U.S.CA. after the text of Rule 56,
indicates that the amendment was made to overcome a line of cases permitting the
opposing party to rest on the well-pleaded averments of his pleading.
77. See Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); note
7 supra.
78. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. C.B.S., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Courts have evidenced the same kind of response, and for the same reason, in cases
where a discharged teacher seeks reinstatement because the discharge allegedly in-
fringed First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School Dist.,
341 F. Supp. 823, 837 (D. Del. 1972).
79. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Norfolk Monument
Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969); First Nat'l Bank v.
Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Poller v. C.B.S., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
80. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. C.B.S., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
citing Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969),
and Poller v. C.B.S., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
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ment should be denied,"' unless the movant's evidence establishes to
a certainty the nonexistence of the essential fact which the opposing
party's evidence implies.8 2 If the evidence favorable to the opposing
party is insufficient to establish a prima facie case, the court might
simply require that he present an adequate excuse and show prospects
for obtaining more. This approach would allow opposing parties who
have a reasonable chance of success to get to trial but would not im-
pose an inflexible and highly stringent evidentiary requirement on
the movant.
Unfortunately, the decisional law fails to deal with the problem in
these terms. Most opinions simply state that the grant of the motion is
inappropriate or that the movant has not discharged his initial burden
because the available evidence gives rise to, or fails to exclude to a cer-
tainty, inferences favorable to the opposing party.8 3 Furthermore, the
opinions typically fail to deal with the distinct question of whether a
jury would be permitted to find the fact for the opposing party on the
basis of the available evidence.
Evaluating the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in the analo-
gous context of a motion for directed verdict has proved to be an ex-
tremely difficult task.84 Consequently, it is scarcely objectionable if
an opinion concludes that the question is close and denies the motion
because the opposing party might present a better case at trial. But the
question is not always close. If, for example, the opposing party has
failed to employ discovery or has employed it extensively and failed
utterly to obtain adequate evidence,8 5 the movant's motion should
probably be granted, especially if the critical evidence is not pecul-
iarly within the movant's control.86
Needless to say, the opposing party may occasionally succeed at trial
in eliciting the necessary evidence from the movant. When his chances
81. See, e.g., Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S.
700 (1969) (plaintiff's circumstantial and testimonial evidence of conspiracy impliedly
held sufficient to reach the jury).
82. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 278-80 (1968) (plaintiff-
opposing party's evidence of conspiracy rebutted by showing that movant-defendant's
refusal to handle Iranian oil resulted from fear of retaliation by the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co., whose property had been nationalized by Iran, and from fear that, if the
nationalization proved successful, other oil-producing countries would follow suit).
83. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. C.B.S., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
84. See Cooper, supra note 19, at 955-68.
85. See, e.g., Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972); Chit-
wood v. Feaster, 54 F.R.D. 204, 216 (N.D. W. Va.), vacated and remanded in part,
468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972); Note, Factors Affecting the Grant or Denial of Summary
Judgment, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 780, 782 (1948).
86. Peculiar access or exclusive control might constitute a valid excuse under FED.
R. Ctv. P. 56(f). See pp. 768-69 infra.
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for success are slim and the attendant imposition upon the movant and
the court's calendar is great, the question is whether the judicial sys-
tem should automatically provide him with this opportunity simply
because his access to the evidence is limited. Given the substantial
backlog of cases in the federal courts, some effort should be made to
minimize the number of apparently futile trials.
A formulary approach for accomplishing this goal would be as fol-
lows: After the movant has presented evidence which would support
a finding of the nonexistence of an essential element of the opposing
party's case, the opposing party should be required to present evidence
sufficient to support an affirmative finding on his case. If he cannot
do so, he may offer an excuse showing reasonable prospects for obtain-
ing more evidence. Viewing the opposing party's prospects with in-
creasing optimism as his proof approaches sufficiency would provide
an extra element of flexibility.
3. Prior Decisions Reconsidered
These principles, while offering clearer guidelines to lower courts,
would in general produce few changes if applied to the decided cases.
In Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,8 7 for instance, the proposed standard
would produce the same result as that which actually occurred. There
plaintiff charged that the defendant, in conspiracy with the police,
refused her lunch counter service. Defendant moved for summary
judgment, relying upon the deposition of the store manager and the
affidavits of several policemen-all denying the conspiracy-and plain-
tiff's admission that she had no direct evidence thereof. The trial court
granted the motion.88 The Supreme Court appeared to find that de-
fendant had discharged its burden with respect to the conspiracy that
was alleged to have arisen before plaintiff entered the store.89 It re-
versed, however, because defendant had failed to deny that such an un-
derstanding arose after she entered the store. Since defendant presented
no evidence on this point, it had failed to discharge its burden. 90 De-
fendant's motion would have to be denied under the proposed ration-
ale, which specifies that the movant must initially present evidence
which would support a finding of nonexistence of an essential element
of the opposing party's case.
Similarly, application of the proposed rationale to summary judg-
87. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
88. 252 F. Supp. 140, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
89. 398 U.S. at 157-58.
90. Id. at 160. It was thus irrelevant that the plaintiff had failed to submit an
affidavit locating a policeman in the store at the time the alleged conspiracy arose. Id.
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ment decisions in the antitrust area would not necessitate different
results. Yet because of a crucial difference in focus, the likelihood of
convergence of outcomes is somewhat problematic. Present antitrust
summary judgment doctrine is well illustrated in the Supreme Court's
1962 holding in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.91 In that
case, CBS, anticipating an amended Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) regulation permitting networks to own additional UHF
stations, acquired through a straw man an option on an unsuccessful
UHF station in Milwaukee. The acquisition was made despite the fact
that CBS had an existing network agreement with another Milwaukee
UHF station, plaintiff's assignor in the case. When the FCC amend-
ment became effective, CBS exercised the option and terminated the
network agreement with the plaintiff's assignor. Lacking network
affiliation, this station was compelled to sell its facilities and equipment
to CBS at a bargain price. Thereafter the disaffiliated station's as-
signor sued CBS to recover treble damages for the lost value of the
business. After extensive discovery, CBS successfully moved for sum-
mary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed 92 and certiorari was
granted.9 3
In reversing the grant of summary judgment by the trial court, the
Court held:
Summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex anti-
trust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile
witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are pres-
ent and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the
weight to be given their testimony can be appraised.
94
The notions expressed in this opinion have come to dominate sum-
mary judgment decisions in the antitrust area, 95 even though they are
not found in Rule 56, which makes no special provision for antitrust
cases. Rather they arise from the fact that such litigation nearly always
91. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
92. 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
93. 365 U.S. 840 (1961).
94. 368 U.S. at 473. The Poller language emphasized the fact that credibility and
demeanor are important in resolving state of mind issues and that a trial and jury
determination are thus desirable. Certainly that is true when the party with the burden
of proof seeks summary judgment on the basis of his own interested testimony with
respect to his own state of mind. But where plaintiff must establish defendant's im-
proper state of mind, he cannot reach the jury without affirmative evidence, even
though no one believes his opponent's denials. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265,
269 (2d Cir. 1952). Thus credibility and demeanor are irrelevant unless plaintiff has
such evidence.
95. See 10 WRIGHT& M m, supra note 6, § 2730, at 587 n.10.
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involves state of mind questions and complicated factual issues. In com-
plex cases the cost and difficulty of assembling a prima facie case and
reducing it to acceptable supporting materials is magnified. Further-
more, the evidence previewed by the parties is less likely to be either
complete or accurate than in simpler cases.
Under the proposed rationale, a technique would exist for taking
these special factors into account. Assuming the plaintiff is the oppos-
ing party, the court might, without relieving him of his basic obliga-
tion to tender an adequate response, excuse an otherwise insufficient
response on the grounds of exorbitant expense or unusual difficulty.
The crucial factor differentiating this approach from present procedure
is that the opposing party would be required to justify his failure to
respond adequately. As a result, the proposed scheme would tend to
prevent plaintiffs with neither proof nor reasonable prospects for find-
ing it from extracting costly settlements.
This difference in approach takes account of cases in which the de-
fendant's state of mind is an essential element of the plaintiff's case.
Under present doctrine, typified by the Poller v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System decision, the mere presence of such issues may result in a
failure to inquire into the sufficiency of the opposing party's response
or his excuse. Under the proposed standard, intent, motive, and other
state of mind issues would be treated initially like other factual ques-
tions.96 That is to say, the plaintiff will have an obligation to respond
adequately to a prima facie showing by defendant of the nonexistence
of a crucial mental state. The plaintiff may well contend that the direct
proof is in the hands of those charged with the wrong, that discovery
has been, or would be, futile, and that he must be permitted to exam-
ine these hostile witnesses at trial. But such contentions go primarily
to establish an excuse under Rule 56(f) and are adequately embraced
by the proposed rationale.
Needless to say, courts should not permit every plaintiff claiming a
need for such examination to go to trial automatically. Those who fail
to employ discovery97 or who have employed extensive discovery to no
avail, for instance, would not be permitted to continue the litigation. s
96. Some courts already recognize that state of mind issues are not generically dif.
ferent from other fact questions. In granting summary judgment on the issue of malice
against the party with the production burden, one court, while noting the general
caveat concerning the advisability of granting summary judgment where state of mind
is an issue, said, "This is, of course, true as a general rule, but generalizations of
this sort do not relieve the courts of their responsibility to decide whether a genuine
issue of fact exists." Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
97. See, e.g., Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (E.D.N.Y.
1970), a!f'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972);
Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
98. Cf. Poller v. C.B.S., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 478 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Such litigants ordinarily would not succeed at trial. On the other hand,
litigants who have some evidence and can show that important wit-
nesses were hostile and evasive during their depositions obviously have
a chance. 9
Under the proposed standard the fact that intent, motive, and other
conditions of the mind are in issue would not automatically impair a
defendant's chances for obtaining summary judgment. But the diffi-
culty of proving such facts would enter into a court's determination of
whether the opposing party's failure is excusable under Rule 56(f).
C. Excusing an Insufficient Response
Sometimes the opposing party cannot make a sufficient response
because the affidavits and other supporting materials available to him
do not represent a realistic preview of the evidence he will be able to
present at trial. He must inform the court of this problem by means
of an affidavit, as provided by Rule 56(f). The court's reaction to such
an affidavit will turn upon the special facts of each case. Nevertheless,
certain patterns do recur and some guidelines can be identified. For
example, the opposing party ordinarily must be permitted on request
to complete his basic investigation and discovery before he is com-
pelled to respond.100 If he makes such a request, he will usually be
accorded a continuance automatically.
0 1
The problems in this connection generally arise when an opposing
party who has apparently completed whatever discovery he intends to
undertake, or who has declined to initiate discovery, seeks to excuse
an insufficient response or a failure to respond. The attempted excuse
may take two forms. The opposing party may seek a continuance to
gather additional evidence or he may simply attempt to persuade the
court to deny the motion for summary judgment. 0 2 While a continu-
ance will be granted more readily than a denial of the motion, the
court considers similar factors in both situations. The opposing party
must show that he has a realistic chance of acquiring enough evidence
to avoid a directed verdict or its equivalent at trial. 0 3 He must also
99. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952).
100. See 10 WN wrir & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2741, at 731-33.
101. See id.
102. See FEn. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Sometimes the court will deny the motion without
prejudice to its reassertion at some later time. Such an order is functionally equiva-
lent to a continuance. See 6 MooRE, supra note 10, 56.24, at 2877.
103. See, e.g., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952). The party not having
the burden of proof sometimes needs very little proof to avoid a directed verdict.
Consequently, he should need as little to avoid a motion for summary judgment when
he is the opposing party. Nevertheless, he must show more than mere hope or specu-
lation that something may turn up at trial. See, e.g., Radio City Music Hall Corp.
v. United States, 135 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1943).
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show that his failure to have the evidence in hand in the form of ac-
ceptable supporting materials is excusable.
10 4
In preparing a Rule 56(f) affidavit the opposing party must ordi-
narily go beyond the simple allegation that additional proof is or will
be available to him.105 He should identify the sources of this antici-
pated proof, 106 indicate why and how he hopes they will be fruitful,
and explain why they are as yet untapped. 0 7 In a few cases where
courts have had serious doubts about the opposing party's diligence or
prospects, they have demanded in advance a detailed statement of the
sources of evidence the opposing party sought to explore and the rea-
sons why he thought they would be productive. 05
When the opposing party seeks to defeat the motion for summary
judgment altogether he must make a stronger showing than when he
merely seeks a continuance. 0 9 In essence he must show that sufficient
evidence will not be available prior to trial and that additional dis-
covery cannot complete his case. Claims of financial hardship have gen-
erally been rejected,1 0 although they would seem to acquire increas-
ing validity as the complexity or size of the case increases.",
A successful claim that additional discovery will be inadequate
usually occurs only in a situation in which the facts are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the moving party.1 12 If the moving party in
such a case bears the burden of proof, he could rarely obtain a directed
verdict at trial because his evidence, though uncontradicted and un-
104. See, e.g., Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932,
937 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Englehard Industries, Inc. v. Research
Instrument Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1963).
105. See, e.g., Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943).
106. See, e.g., Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715, 718
(2d Cir. 1943).
107. See, e.g., School Board v. Richardson, 332 F. Supp. 1263, 1269 (N.D. Fla. 1971);
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1946), vacated on other grounds,
166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948). Ordinarily a statement
by the opposing party that he was initially unaware of the existence of a potential
source of evidence is not an adequate excuse, Once the source is disclosed or iden-
tified, the opposing party must immediately initiate investigation or discovery or seek
a continuance to do so. See, e.g., Robin Construction Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d
610, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1965).
108. See, e.g., School Board v. Richardson, 332 F. Supp. 1263, 1269 (N.D. Fla. 1971).
109. It has been noted that few courts have actually allowed the opposing party
to defeat the motion in this fashion and that, by and large, it is a possibility merely
recognized in dictum. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2740, at 727-28 nn.20-22.
110. See, e.g., Grimm v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984, 991 (N.D.
Cal. 1969).
111. Counterbalancing this consideration is the fact that, in complicated litigation,
the cost to the moving party and the system of a useless trial, see Topp-Cola Co. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 185 F. Supp. 700, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), as well as the size of opposing
party's potential recovery, see Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27
F.R.D. 468, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), also tend to increase. Thus, such financial excuses
should properly be rejected unless they are accompanied by evidence showing some
effort to obtain additional information and some prospects for obtaining more.
112. See 6 MOORE, supra note 10, 56.24, at 2875; 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
6, § 2741, at 735, 737.
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impeached, is interested. 113 His motion for summary judgment should
similarly be denied, particularly if he seeks to establish his own intent
or state of mind through his own interested testimony; in such a case
his credibility and demeanor would be appropriate objects for scrutiny
at trial."1
4
The problem is more complex if the opposing party has the burden
of proof. He could not get to the jury on the mere possibility that the
jurors might disbelieve the denials made by the moving party and his
allies when called as hostile witnesses as on cross-examination.' 15 He
would have to introduce affirmative evidence. Should summary judg-
ment be granted if the moving party in such a case offers the denials
in support of his motion? The opposing party would argue that cross-
examination of these hostile witnesses at trial may be productive in
the sense of eliciting damaging admissions and that he is at least en-
titled to try. Some judges agree, especially if the witnesses when de-
posed were hostile and evasive; such witnesses might behave differently
before a judge at trial." 6
A different result is likely, however, if the witnesses were coopera-
tive and unevasive on deposition, 1 7 or if the opposing party chose not
to depose them."18 In the latter circumstance some courts have held
that Rule 56(f) should not afford relief."19
Conclusion
The primary function of summary judgment is to intercept factually
deficient claims and defenses in advance of trial. But the present pro-
cedure is unsatisfactory in that it fails to differentiate between movants
who would have the trial proof burden and those who would not. A
better approach would be to harmonize the initial summary judgment
evidentiary burden with the burden of proof at trial. While movants
with the trial burden should be held to a strict standard, movants not
having that burden should be able to sustain their initial evidentiary
burden by a prima facie showing.
113. See Cooper, supra note 19, at 941-46.
114. See Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir. 1964). (Summary judgment
should be denied where factual issues of motive, intent, and subjective feeling turn ex-
clusively on the credibility of the movant's witnesses.)
115. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
116. See id. (dictum).
117. See generally id.; 3 NV. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 63, § 1232.2, at 113-14.
118. See, e.g., Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401, 407-09 (8th Cir. 1966); Orvis v.
Brickman, 95 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D.D.C. 1951), afj'd, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2740, at 726 n.16.
119. See, e.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rev'd
on other grounds, 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948). See
generally 10 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2741 nn.50 & 65.
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